Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 42
Issue 5 November 2009

Article 3

2009

UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the
Rule of Law
Simon Chesterman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the National Security Law Commons, Rule of Law Commons, and the Transnational Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Simon Chesterman, UNaccountable? The United Nations, Emergency Powers, and the Rule of Law, 42
Vanderbilt Law Review 1509 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol42/iss5/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

UNaccountable?
The United Nations, Emergency
Powers, and the Rule of Law
Simon Chesterman*

ABSTRACT

For a body committed to the rule of law in theory, the
applicability of the rule of law to the United Nations in practice
remains oddly unclear. This Article will not consider the
personal responsibility of UN officials, who generally enjoy
personal or functional immunity from legal process in the
territories where they work. Rather the focus of this Article is on
the quasi-constitutional question of the liability of the
organization itself. As the United Nations has assumed more
state-like functions-in particularthrough the coercive activities
of its Security Council-the question of what limits exist on the
powers thus exercised has become more pressing. These powers
may be compared to emergency powers within the domestic
jurisdiction of states.
Whereas a state of emergency is
traditionally invoked in order to justify a departure from or
stretching of the rule of law, here the existence of an emergency
is a prerequisiteto invoking the rule of law at all. At the same
time, those promoting the rule of law generally lie beyond the
reach of the jurisdiction in question-both during times of
emergency and in times of quiet.

* B.A. (Honors), University of Melbourne, 1995; LL.B. (Honors), University of
Melbourne, 1997; D. Phil., University of Oxford, 2000; Global Professor and Director of
the New York University School of Law Singapore Program; Professor, National
University of Singapore Faculty of Law. This Article was originally conceived as a
chapter for EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY (Victor

V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., forthcoming Dec. 2009) and draws upon
passages previously published in SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED
NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING (2004). I am deeply
indebted to Mark Fenwick, Karin Loevy, Victor Ramraj, Barnett Rubin, Arun
Thiruvengadam, and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journal of TransnationalLaw for
comments on earlier drafts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Above all we must remember that the ways of Orientals are not our
ways, nor their thoughts our thoughts. Often when we think them
backward and stupid, they think us meddlesome and absurd. The loom
of time moves slowly with them, and they care not for high pressure
and the roaring of the wheels. Our system may be good for us; but it is
neither equally, nor altogether good for them. Satan found it better to
reign in hell than to serve in heaven; and the normal Asiatic would
sooner be misgoverned by Asiatics than well governed by Europeans.
Lord Curzon, 18891

In 1952, a committee of the American Society of International
Law considered whether the laws of war should apply to United
Nations (UN) enforcement actions.
After struggling with the
question, the committee noted that the UN held a "superior legal and
moral position ' 2 to the States Parties to the relevant conventions and
concluded that the organization should "select such of the laws of war
as may seem to fit its purposes. '3 This conferred extraordinary
latitude upon the United Nations, which at the time consisted of only

1.
2 GEORGE N. CURZON, PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN QUESTION 630-31 (Barnes
& Noble, Inc. 1966) (1892).

2.

William J. Bivens et al., Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations

Enforcement Action?, 46 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 216, 217 (1952).
3.
Id. at 220.
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sixty countries. Since that time, UN membership has more than
tripled, and the organization itself has affirmed-though only in
1999-that international humanitarian law does indeed apply to
4
peacekeeping and other operations.
For a body ostensibly committed to the rule of law in theory, 5 the
applicability of the rule of law to the UN in practice remains oddly
unclear.
A historical reason for this was the uncertain legal
personality of this club of states when it was created, which had to be
inferred by the International Court of Justice four years later. 6 With
respect to specific bodies of law, an ongoing problem is that the UN is
not itself a party to, among other things, the human rights treaties
7
negotiated under its auspices.
This Article will not consider the personal responsibility of UN
officials, who generally enjoy personal or functional immunity from
legal process in the territories where they work.8 Rather the focus is
on the quasi-constitutional question of the liability of the organization
itself. As the UN has assumed more state-like functions-in
particular through the coercive activities of its Security Council-the
question of what limits there are on its powers has become more
pressing. Though there are significant problems with applying
concepts such as the rule of law uncritically at the international
level, 9 the focus here will be the manner in which the UN Security

See The Secretary-General, Observance by United Nations Forces of
4.
International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999) (setting
out principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United
Nations forces).
5.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 134(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005)
(stating that member states unanimously reaffirm their commitment to "an
international order based on the rule of law and international law, which is essential
for peaceful coexistence and cooperation among States").
6.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
7.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (listing 165
parties but not the UN).
8.
For a discussion of this topic, see Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15,
(adopting
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/p&i-convention.htm
legal immunity); The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question
of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005) (presenting a report from Prince Zeid of Jordan to
the Secretary-General on comprehensive strategy to elimitate sexual exploitation and
abuse in UN peacekeeping operations); and Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to
Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J.
IN'L L. 103 (2002) (discussing the immunity of UN peacekeepers).
9.
See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J.
COMP. L. 331, 355-60 (2008) (discussing the concept of an international rule of law and
theoretical barriers, such as the "assumption that domestic legal principles can be
translated directly to the international sphere").
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Council has used the rule of law as a tool, particularly in situations
involving actual or potential conflict, and the extent to which the rule
of law has constrained the exercise of power by the Council or its
delegates.
The Council's powers thus invoked derive from Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, and they are the sole exception to the saving clause
that renders the domestic jurisdiction of Member States otherwise
inviolable. 10
These powers may be invoked when the Council
determines that there has been a "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression."1 1 Such a framework clearly resonates
with a doctrine of emergency powers. 1 2 What is interesting is that
whereas a state of emergency is traditionally invoked in order to
justify a departure from or stretching of the rule of law, here the
existence of an emergency is a prerequisite to invoking the rule of law
at all. At the same time, however, those promoting the rule of law
generally lie beyond the reach of the jurisdiction in question-both
13
during times of emergency and in times of quiet.
This Article will examine these two issues-the use of the rule of
law at the international level as a tool and its application to those
who wield it-with a particular emphasis on UN operations in Asia,
notably Timor-Leste (East Timor) and Afghanistan. Part II will
examine the ways in which the rule of law has been used to stabilize
conflict zones, focusing on the activities of the UN Security Council
from the mid-1990s onwards and in particular on Timor-Leste. Part
III will consider the extent to which the rule of law has constrained
the decisions and actions of the Council, focusing on accountability
issues and the apparent compromise of these principles in
Afghanistan.
Part IV will consider what light (if any) these
operations shed on larger questions, such as whether there are

10.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

Id.
11.

Id. art. 39.

12.

See generally Jared Schott, Chapter VII as Exception: Security Council

Action and the Regulative Ideal of Emergency, 6 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 24 (2007)
(acknowledging the emergency doctrine but arguing that it is a "regulative ideal"
allowing the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII authority with little
accountability).
13.
See, e.g., id. at 79 ("Whether the imperative of international security is
invoked as an after-the-fact rationalization for derogations, or is in fact part of the
preliminary calculus leading thereto, the normative exceptionalism of Chapter VII is
crystallized, and without corresponding limits the notion of a lawless and
unanswerable cadre of actors is reinforced.").
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discernibly Western or Asian approaches to the role law plays in
times of crisis.
Of particular interest is the extent to which the UN can be said
to reflect Western values, as is frequently alleged. A tentative
conclusion is that there may be some rhetorical merit to this claim:
Western states do largely set the agenda for the human rights
14
framework that is commonly used to judge state actions.
Nevertheless, the United Nations and the international system wield
executive authority so infrequently and inconstantly that broad
conclusions are not yet possible. More interesting is the manner in
which internationally administered "emergency" powers demonstrate
the willingness of even established democracies to invoke the rule of
law instrumentally, as a tool to provide stability-implicitly to
compromise rule of law principles in the name of security. 15 At the
same time, this Article also will attempt to shed some light on the
underlying question of whether it even makes sense to speak of
"emergency" powers before the rule of law has been established in a
meaningful sense.

II. INVOKING THE RULE OF LAW AS A RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY
The rule of law has long been invoked in human rights treaties
as the foundation of a legitimate state 16 and in development policies
as the basis for a sustainable economy. 17 Frequently this invocation

See, e.g., Ashwani Peetush, Global Ethics, Human Rights and Non-Western
14.
Values, 1 GLOBAL STUD. J. 63 (2007) (arguing that criticism of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as being parochial and biased towards Western values is
well-founded).
100 ("Domestic emergency powers have a
15.
See Schott, supra note 12,
tendency to creep into non.emergency spheres and thereby weaken republican and
constitutional safeguards in these areas.").
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl.,
16.
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) ("[I]t is essential,
if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.").
For a discussion of the relationship between human rights and the rule of law, see

Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36
GEO. J. INT'L L. 809 (2005).
17.
For an early link between the rule of law, the free market, and economic
prosperity, see generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). In the 1960s, the U.S. Agency
for International Development, the Ford Foundation, and other private American
donors began an ambitious program to reform the laws and judicial institutions of
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM:
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 7-8 (1980). The 'law and

development" movement, steeped in dependency theory, generated hundred of reports
and articles-yet a decade later, leading academic participants and a former official at
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has been of greater rhetorical significance than political significance,
in the same way that a great many states invoke the rule of law in
theory with little effort to implement it in practice. More recently,
however, the rule of law has also been used at the international level
by the UN Security Council as a means of conflict resolution.18 This
Part considers the manner in which the Council has used the rule of
law as a response to "emergencies" and then assesses how this played
out in Timor-Leste. Following David Dyzenhaus, 19 an examination of
the relationship between the rule of law and emergencies may be best
pursued through consideration of practical examples. Two elements
are of special interest: what the UN did while exercising a degree of
control over the territory and what influence (if any) this had on
subsequent governance practices.
20
A. The Security Council's Uses of the Rule of Law

Apart from a preambular reference in relation to the
deterioration of law and order in the Congo in 1961,21 the Security
Council first used the words "rule of law" in the operative paragraph
of Resolution 1040 (1996), where it expressed its support for the
Secretary-General's efforts to promote "national reconciliation,
democracy, security and the rule of law in Burundi. ' '22 (It is
noteworthy that the French text rendered rule of law as "le
rdtablissement de l'ordre.'' 23)
Many peace operations have
subsequently had important rule of law components, such as those in
Guatemala (1997),24 Liberia (2003-),25 C6te d'Ivoire (2004-),26 Haiti

the Ford Foundation declared it a failure. Id. at 211; John H. Merryman, Comparative
Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and
Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and
Development in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062.
18.
See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
19.
David Dyzenhaus, The State of Emergency in Legal Theory, in GLOBAL
ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 65 (Victor V. Ramraj et. al. eds., 2005).
20.
This section draws upon a few passages from Security Council Resolutions
discussed at greater length in An InternationalRule of Law? Chesterman, supra note
9.
21.
S.C. Res. 161B, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/4741 (Feb. 21, 1961) ("Noting with deep
regret and concern the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the general absence of the rule of law in the Congo"; the relevant
corresponding French text was 'Tabsence gdndrale de ldgalit6 au Congo").
22.
S.C. Res. 1040, para. 2, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1040 (Jan. 29, 1996).
23.
Id. (from the French translation of the document). This translates to "the
reestablishment of order."
24.
S.C. Res. 1094, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1094 (Jan. 20, 1997).
25.
S.C. Res. 1509, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003) (establishing
the United Nations Mission in Liberia).
26.
S.C. Res. 1528, para. 6(q), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004)
(authorizing the UN Operation in C~te d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to "assist the Government of
National Reconciliation in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international
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(2004-),27 and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2007-).28 The
mandates for such missions tend to be broad, calling for the "reestablishment" or "restoration and maintenance" of the rule of law
without formally articulating what this might entail. 29 In practice,
the dominant activities have tended to include personnel training,
assisting institution-building, advising on law reform issues, and
monitoring, with the emphasis on criminal law processes. 30 Less
31
attention has been paid, for example, to land law.
In addition to supporting domestic rule of law institutions, the
Security Council has created international criminal tribunals to
replace domestic processes for trials arising from the former

organizations in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law
throughout Cbte d'Ivoire").
27.
S.C. Res. 1542, para. 7(I)(d), U.N. Doc. SJRES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004)
(authorizing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti to facilitate "the restoration and

maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti through
provision inter alia of operational support to the Haitian National Police and
Haitian Coast Guard, as well as with their institutional strengthening, including
re-establishment of the corrections system").
28.
S.C. Res. 1756, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1756 (May 15, 2007). Here,
Security Council determined the following:

the
the
the
the

MONUC [UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo]
will also have the mandate, in close cooperation with the Congolese authorities,
the United Nations country team and donors, to support the strengthening of
democratic institutions and the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and, to that end, to ...(c) [a]ssist in the promotion and protection of
human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable
persons, investigate human rights violations with a view to putting an end to
impunity, assist in the development and implementation of a transitional
justice strategy, and cooperate in national and international efforts to bring to
justice perpetrators of grave violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law; ...(e) [alssist in the establishment of a secure and peaceful
environment for the holding of free and transparent elections; (f)
[c]ontribute to
the promotion of good governance and respect for the principle of
accountability.
Id. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL, 1991-1995) had a rule of law
component within its human rights division. See El Salvador-ONUSAL Background,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co-mission/onusalbackgr2.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2009) (summarizing the final months of ONUSAL).
29.
See S.C. Res. 1528, supra note 26, para. 6(q) (using "re-establishment");
S.C. Res. 1542, supra note 27, para. 7(I)(d) (using "restoration and maintenance").
30.
Vivienne O'Connor, Rule of Law and Human Rights Protections Through
Criminal Law Reform: Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice, 13 INT'L
PEACEKEEPING 517, 517 (2006).
31.
See, e.g., Daniel Fitzpatrick, Land Policy in Post-Conflict Circumstances:
Some Lessons from East Timor (Evaluation & Policy Analysis Unit, United Nations
High Comm'r for Refugees, Working Paper No. 58, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3c8399e14.html (highlighting the importance of land and housing
policies to post-conflict issues and making suggestions for their incorporation based on
the author's experience with UNTAET in East Timor).

1516

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1509

Yugoslavia (1991-)32 and Rwanda (1994).33 These tribunals were
explicitly created as part of an effort to bring peace to war-torn
territories, but they have been criticized for spending significant
resources in order to prosecute few individuals with little lasting
34
impact on the judicial institutions of the territory concerned.
Hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone 35 and
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,3 6 were
intended to blend international supervision with development of
37
national capacity but have had limited success.

In two situations, Kosovo (1999-2008)38 and Timor-Leste (19992002), 39 the UN assumed direct responsibility for the administration
of justice, including control of police and prison services. (Similar
powers were exercised in Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Office
of the High Representative from 1996.40) Resolution 1272 (1999), for
example, determined that the situation in Timor-Leste constituted a
threat to peace and security and invoked the Security Council's
Chapter VII powers. 41
It established the UN Transitional
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and endowed it with
"overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor," granting
the new body power "to exercise all legislative and executive
authority, including the administration of justice. '42 UNTAET had
further authorization "to take all necessary measures to fulfil its
mandate. '43 These potentially dictatorial powers were tempered by
the political understanding that the Timorese people had voted
overwhelmingly for independence and that this transition should be

32.
S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
33.
S.C. Res. 955, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
34.
E.g., David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Success and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F.
WORLD. AFF. 7, 12-17 (2002) (exploring criticisms of the I.C.T.Y. despite the vast
resources invested in it).
35.
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137.
36.
Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
37.
See David Cohen, "Hybrid" Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia: "Lessons Learned" and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 3638 (2007) (summarizing the successes and shortcomings of the hybrid tribunals).
38.
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
39.
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
40.
S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (Dec. 12, 1996).
41.
S.C. Res. 1272, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
42.
Id. para. 1.
43.
Id. para. 4.
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Timor-Leste duly became
overseen by the United Nations. 44
45
independent two-and-a-half years later.
The frequency with which the rule of law is now invoked through
the UN as a means of preventing or responding to crises has led to a
proliferation of institutions, notably including a new Rule of Law
Coordination and Resource Group and a Rule of Law Unit. 46 The
roles attributed to the rule of law as a response to crises have also
47
been reflected in the burgeoning literature on the subject.
That literature rarely considers the irony that lawless means are
being used to promote law (though that irony tends not to be lost on
the locals). 48 Some analogize this to the laws of military occupation
and colonialism, in particular the civilizing mission incorporated
more openly in texts such as the League of Nations Covenant, which
explicitly provided that "the tutelage of [peoples not yet able to stand
by themselves] should be entrusted to advanced nations who by
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical

44.
Id. pmbl.
45.
Timor-Leste was internationally recognized as an independent state on
May 20, 2002. CIA World Factbook-Timor-Leste, https://www.cia.govflibrary/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tt.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
The Secretary-General, Uniting Our Strengths: Enhancing United Nations
46.
Support for the Rule of Law, para. 48, delivered to the Security Council and the General
Assembly, UN Doc. S/2006/980, A/61/636 (Dec. 14, 2006).
See generally RICHARD CAPLAN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF WAR47.
TORN TERRITORIES: RULE AND RECONSTRUCTION (2005) (examining the nature of
international administration operations since the mid-1990s, their effectiveness, and
the key operational and political challenges which arise); JANE STROMSETH, DAVID
WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW
AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS (2006) (examining the difficulties of creating a rule of
law in post-conflict societies and offering insights into how policy-makers can improve
future rule of law efforts); DOMINIK ZAUM, THE SOVEREIGNTY PARADOX: THE NORMS
AND POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL STATEBUILDING (2007) (examining the normative
framework underlying international state-building efforts through case studies of
international administrations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste);
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 95
(discussing reasons for increased attention to the idea of a rule of law).
See, e.g., Xanana Gusmao: The Right to Live in Peace and Harmony,
48.
available at http://www.cpa.org.au/z31,
2001,
(Austl.), Jan.
GUARDIAN
archive/g2001/g1031.html (follow link for "Xanana Gusmao's New Year's Message")
(President Gusmao's message to East Timor). In his message, President Gusmao
criticized this phenomenon:
We are witnessing another phenomenon in East Timor; that of an obsessive
acculturation to standards that hundreds of international experts try to convey
to the East Timorese, who are hungry for values: democracy (many of those
who teach us never practised it in their own countries because they became UN
staff members); human rights (many of those who remind us of them forget the
situation in their own countries); gender (many of the women who attend the
workshops know that in their countries this issue is no example for others).
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position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to
accept it." ' 49 This language of a "sacred trust" survived in the present
50
UN Charter.
A more interesting analogy for present purposes is that which
one might draw between the UN Security Council and the Roman law
concept of iustitium. 5 1 As Giorgio Agamben has argued, this state of

exception represents not the fullness of powers but "an emptiness and
standstill of the law. ' 52 In times of crisis, the Security Council does
not invoke emergency powers in the sense of enhanced centralized
authority; rather, the crisis (a threat to international peace and
security) justifies a temporary suspension of the law (the nonintervention principle enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter) for
53
a specific purpose (restoration of peace and security).
Formally, states have agreed to this arrangement through their
UN membership, 54 even though such powers go somewhat beyond
what the original Charter contemplated.5 5
In the 1990s, that
expansion could be tracked by the language used to justify each step

as "unique" (Somalia in 1992),56 "unique and exceptional" (Haiti in

49.
50.

League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 2.
U.N. Charter art. 73. Article 73 states:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace
and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the
inhabitants of these territories.
Id.
51.

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 48-49 (Kevin Attel, trans., Univ.

of Chicago Press 2005) (1942) (describing the concept of iustitium).
52.
Id. at 48; see also Stephen Humphreys, Legalizing Lawlessness: On Giorgio
Agamben's State of Exception, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 681-82 (2006) (providing a
general overview of the concept of iustitium and Agamben's use of the concept in STATE
OF EXCEPTION).

53.
Cf. Nehal Bhuta, The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 721, 726, 735 (2005) (discussing the partial suspension of laws for military
necessity and the accompanying obligation to restore order and providing the example
of the U.S. and U.K. as "occupying powers" in Iraq).
54.
See U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 110 (providing that member countries have
agreed to Charter and that upon ratification of Charter, country becomes member of
the United Nations).
55.

See NIGEL D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 90-91

(2d ed., Manchester Univ. Press 2005) (1996) (noting that the scope of Article 2(7) is
deliberately unclear and that in practice, the Security Council has "developed its own
interpretation as to what constitutes intervention and domestic jurisdiction"); cf. U.N.
Charter art. 2(7) (stating that nothing in the UN Charter authorizes the organization
to intervene in matters that are "essentially within domestic jurisdiction" but that the
principle does not "prejudice the application of enforcement measures").
56.
S.C. Res. 794, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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1993),57 and again "unique" (Rwanda in 1994).58 Predictably, these
powers have become most controversial when they slipped from the
exceptional into the normal, as the Security Council's powers
arguably have in the over-use of targeted financial sanctions and
legislative resolutions. In the former case, sanctions in principle
operate, for example, to prevent the financing of terrorist acts: as
asset freezes stretch into more than a decade, these preventive acts
based on secret intelligence look more like a form of punitive
confiscation unsupported by evidence. 59 In the latter case, the ability
of the Security Council to respond swiftly and robustly to
international threats has crept towards using those powers to issue
norms of general application without operating through the normal60
and cumbersome-processes of international law.
Although the UN is a highly unique organization with respect to
the coercive powers granted to its security organ, regional
organizations of more recent vintage have been granted explicit
powers to be critical of, among other things, non-constitutional
changes of government. 61 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in its previous incarnation as the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted
the Copenhagen Document in 1990, in which Member States
recognized their responsibility to defend and protect "the democratic
order freely established through the will of the people against the
activities of persons, groups or organizations that engage in or refuse
to renounce terrorism or violence aimed at the overthrow of that

S.C. Res. 841, para. 14, U.N. Doe. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993).
57.
58.
S.C. Res. 929, para. 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/929 (June 22, 1994).
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
59.
60.
See Stefan A. Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AM. J.
INT'L L. 175, 175 (2005) (characterizing the role of the United Nations as an
international legislative body and noting Security Council resolutions that imposed
financial sanctions, travel bans, and requirements on member states to combat
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction); cf. Simon Chesterman,
The UN Security Council and the Rule of Law, in Letter from Gerhard Pfanzelter,
Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations, to Sec'y-Gen., United
Nations Sec. Council, Annex, UN Doc. A/63169-Sl2008/270 (May 7, 2008) (discussing
the role of the UN Security Council in strengthening a rules-based international
system).
61.
Se Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations Sec'y-Gen., Speech to the High-Level
Segment of the 15th Non-Aligned Movement Summit (July 15, 2009), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search full.asp?statlD=541 ("I note
the strong stand of regional organizations such as the African Union and the
Organization of American States against any unconstitutional regime change."); Marc
Lacey & Ginger Thompson, Honduras is Rattled as Leader Tries Return, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2O09/O7/O6/world/americas/
06honduras.html (following the ouster of Honduran president Manuel Zelaya, the OAS
suspended the country's membership in the organization).
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order or of that of another participating state. '62 The European
Union (EU) has even more intrusive powers with respect to its
members.6 3 In 1992, the Organization of American States (OAS)
amended its charter to permit suspension of a member whose
democratic government has been overthrown by force." 4 Going one
step further in 2000, the African Union (AU) adopted a constitutive
act that recognized "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member
State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave
circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity. '6 5 Most recently, at the 2005 World Summit, the UN
endorsed the "responsibility to protect," and Member States declared
their preparedness
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter
VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
66
humanity.

These developments are in contrast with the more traditional
conception of sovereignty that Asian institutions tend to embrace.
Asia lacks comparable bodies to the EU/OSCE, the OAS, or the AU.
The bodies that do exist, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization or the embryonic human rights body within the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have either
extremely weak mechanisms or no provision at all for scrutiny of

62.
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, Copenhagen, Den., June 5-29, 1990, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, para. 6 (June 29, 1990), as
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/
1990/06/13992_en.pdf. For background information on the adoption of the Copenhagen
Document, see Malvina Halberstam, The Copenhagen Document: Intervention in
Support of Democracy, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 163 (1993).
63.
See Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, The Amsterdam Treaty:
Freedom, Security, and Justice, http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/institutionalaffairs/treaties/amsterdam treaty/al0000en.htm
(last visited Nov. 2,
2009)
(summarizing the Treaty of Amsterdam, which provides procedures for establishing the
breach and suspension of a member state by the European Council when a country
violates principles upon which the Union was founded-including principles of human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law).
64.
Organization of American States Charter art. 9, Apr. 30, 1948, 119
U.N.T.S. 3. Suspension is not automatic, however, and must be approved by a twothirds majority of the OAS member states. Id. art. 9(b).
65.
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h), July 11, 2000, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/23.15, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AboutAU/ConstitutiveActen.htm.
66.
2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, para. 139, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005).
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members. 6 7 This is not to say that such questions of institutional
design are explicable by Asian cultural or political differences, but it
does suggest that-at least in this respect-Asia provides a useful
counterpoint to the general trend towards greater delegation of
powers to international organizations.

B. Applying the Rule of Law in Timor-Leste
Leaving aside the question of what international organizations
have been empowered to do in theory, what happens in practice when
forces are deployed on the ground? This Article will not rehearse the
pre-1999 history of Timor-Leste. 68
When the Australia-led
International Force-East Timor (INTERFET) landed-formally
authorized by both a Security Council resolution 69 and Indonesian
consent 7 0-they swiftly drew up a Detainee Ordinance that provided
for temporary detention of any person suspected of or on trial for
committing a "serious offence," voluntary detainees, and any person
detained as "a security risk." 71 "Serious offence" was defined by
reference to certain chapters of the Indonesian Penal Code. 72 Plans
had been made to transfer persons so detained to Indonesian civilian
authorities, but the collapse of those structures soon led to the
creation of a Detainee Management Unit (DMU) to review detention
cases, comparable to a bail hearing except on the basis of written
submissions. 73 Between October 21, 1999, and January 12, 2000, the

67.
See Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations art. 14, Nov. 12,
2007, available at http://www.aseansec.org/ASEAN-Charter.pdf (providing for the
establishment of a human rights body but not specifying any power held by the body).
68.
For accounts of pre-1999 Timor-Leste, see generally GUNS AND BALLOT
BOXES: EAST TIMOR'S VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE (Damien Kingsbury ed., 2000)
(collection essays by observers and participants documenting the path to East Timor's
independence); IAN MARTIN, SELF-DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED
NATIONS, THE BALLOT, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (2001) (describing an

insider's account of events leading up to the international intervention in East Timor
following the country's election for independence, written by the UN SecretaryGeneral's Special Representative in East Timor); and JOSE RAMOS-HORTA, FuNU: THE
UNFINISHED SAGA OF EAST TIMOR (1987) (documenting the genocide of the Timorese
people during Indonesian occupation in a memoir by the current president and former
prime minister of East Timor).
69.
S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1264 (Sept. 15, 1999).
70.
See id. at 2 (referring to requests by the Indonesian government to the UN
Secretary-General for the establishment of a multi-national force in East Timor). From
a legal perspective this consent would appear to be redundant.
71.
Bruce M. Oswald, Model Codes for Criminal Justice and Peace Operations:
Some Legal Issues, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 253, 269 (2004) (citing INTERFET
Detainee Ordinance, § 12 (Oct. 21, 1999)).
72.
Id. (citing INTERFET Detainee Ordinance, supra note 71, § 1).
73.
Michael J. Kelly et al., Legal Aspects of Australia's Involvement in the
InternationalForce for East Timor, 841 INT'L REV. RED CROSS, MAR. 31, 2001, at 101,
available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/57JQZ2.
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DMU reviewed sixty cases, after which all detainees were handed
74
over to civilian authorities under the auspices of UNTAET.
Following the transfer of power to the civilian UNTAET
operation, an early order of business was to determine what law
applied. In Kosovo, the controversial mission authorized just months
earlier, choice of law had been politically fraught. Pursuant to
Russian insistence, and consistent with Resolution 1244 (1999), the
first UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
regulation established that the law in force before March 24, 1999
(the commencement date of NATO's air campaign) was applicable,
"provided that this law was consistent with internationally
recognized human rights standards and Security Council Resolution
1244. The largely Albanian judiciary that was put in place by
UNMIK rejected this, however, with some judges reportedly stating
that they would not apply 'Serbian' law in Kosovo. ' '75 Although the
judges accepted some federal laws, including the federal code of
criminal procedure, they "insisted on applying the Kosovo Criminal
Code and other provincial laws that had been in effect in March
1989," asserting that Belgrade had illegally revoked them. 76

"The

judges nevertheless 'borrowed' from the 1999 law to deal with cases
involving crimes not covered in the 1989 Code, such as drugtrafficking and war crimes. '' 77 This dispute not only lowered hopes of
Serb judges returning to office, but it also "further undermined local
respect for UNMIK," particularly in December 1999, when UNMIK
passed a regulation that finally reversed its earlier decision and

74.

Id.

75.
SIMON CHESTERMAN,
TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION,

You, THE PEOPLE:
AND STATE-BUILDING

THE UNITED NATIONS,
166 (2004) [hereinafter

CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE] (citing On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, §§ 2-3, U.N. Doc. UNMIKJREG/1999/1
(July 25, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 1999/1]); Simon Chesterman, Justice Under
InternationalAdministration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan, INT'L PEACE ACAD.

REP., Sept. 2002, at 5 [hereinafter Chesterman, Justice Under International
Administration];see also The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, paras. 55-56, delivered to
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1250 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK
Report] (noting that "the local judicial community ha[d] been extremely reluctant to
apply these laws").
76.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
5; see also UNMIK Report, supra note 75, para. 55 (noting an extreme reluctance to
apply Serbian criminal law, which the judges viewed as having been "part and parcel of
the revocation of Kosovo's prior autonomous status and an instrument of oppression
since then").
77.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
5; see also WILLIAM G. O'NEILL, Kosovo: AN UNFINISHED PEACE 80 (2002) (noting that

the judges' practice of borrowing from the 1999 law for such cases damaged their
credibility).
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declared the laws in effect on March 22, 1989 as the applicable law in
78
Kosovo.
79
In Timor-Leste, by contrast, choice of law was uncontroversial.
UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 defined the applicable law as "the laws
applied in East Timor prior to 25 October 1999. ''80 The specific choice
of language (i.e., "the laws applied," as opposed to "the applicable
laws") was meant to avoid "the retroactive legitimization of the
These laws were not translated from
Indonesian occupation." 8'
Indonesian to English, however, "greatly complicating the efforts of
international judges to inform themselves of the laws governing the
territory."8 2 Institutions were sometimes developed idiosyncratically:
found itself, for example, with German-style
Timor-Leste
investigative judges-an outcome not unconnected with the fact that
83
UNTAET's legal adviser at the time happened to be German.
Although Timor-Leste, in contrast to Kosovo, presented fewer
security and political issues, "the lack of local capacity presented
immense challenges."8 4 For example, no Timorese lawyer had been
appointed to a judiciary or prosecutorial position during Indonesian
rule.8 5 A Transitional Judicial Service Commission, comprised of
three Timorese and two international experts, was established,8 6 but
in order to search for qualified legal personnel with no access to a

78.
CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 166 (citing On
the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, UNMIK Reg. 1999/24, § 1.1,
U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/1999/24 (Dec. 12, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Reg. 1999/24]);
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at 5.
79.
CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 170; Chesterman,
Justice UnderInternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at 7.
80.
On the Authority of the Transitional Administration in East Timor,
UNTAET Reg. 1999/1, § 3.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/1 (Nov. 27, 1999).
Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary for East Timor:
81.
Challenges of a Fledgling Nation, 11 CRIM. L.F. 259, 267 n.18 (2000) [hereinafter
Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary], quoted in CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE,
supra note 75, at 170 n.58.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
82.
15; see also Hansj6rg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System:
The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 59 (2001)
[hereinafter Strohmeyer, Collapse] (describing the challenge of translating the existing
laws so that international experts might assist the local judiciary the practical
application of the UNTAET formula).
83.
ZAUM, supra note 47, at 232; see also Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82,
at 46 n.* (biographical note on Strohmeyer, the acting legal advisor to UNTAET).
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
84.
7.
85.
Id.; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 269;
Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82, at 53.
CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 170 (citing On the
86.
Establishment of a Transitional Judicial Service Commission, UNTAET Reg. 1999/3, §
2.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/1999/3 (Dec. 3, 1999) [hereinafter UNTAET Reg.
1999/3]); Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at 7.
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functioning broadcasting network, INTERFET had to drop leaflets
from planes. 8 7 Even still, after two months, more than sixty qualified
Timorese lawyers had formally applied for positions, and the first
eight judges and two prosecutors were appointed and sworn in on
January 7, 2000.88
The reliance on inexperienced local legal personnel resulted from
a mix of both politics and pragmatism. 89 On one hand, appointment
of the first Timorese legal officers following international intervention
carried enormous symbolic importance. 90 At the same time, the
numerous emergency detentions resulting from the Australian-led
INTERFET operation necessitated the urgent appointment of judges
with an existing knowledge of local civil law and without need for the
extensive translation services typically demanded by international
Additionally, INTERFET considered the inevitable
judges. 9 1
temporariness of appointing international judges, which would9 2cause
further disruption when international funds began to diminish.
In the end, UNTAET was more aggressive in Timorizing the
management of judicial systems than the institutions working in
political and civil affairs. 93 "The trade-off, of course, was in formal
qualifications and practical experience. Some of the appointees had
worked in law firms and legal aid organizations in Indonesia; others

Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
87.
7; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 263; Strohmeyer, Collapse,
supra note 82, at 54.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
88.
7; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 263-64, 264 n.12;
Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82, at 54 & n.39.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supranote 75, at
89.
7; see also Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary,supra note 81, at 264-66 (discussing
the "multi-faceted" rationale for hiring exclusively Timorese legal personnel);
Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82, at 54 (listing the various reasons for INTERFET's
"rapid appointment" of local legal personnel).
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
90.
7; see also Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 264-66 (listing
political sensitivity following intervention as one rationale); Strohmeyer, Collapse,
supra note 82, at 54 (noting that appointment potentially carried "massive political
significance").
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
91.
7; see also Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 266 (noting the
urgent need for review of the INTERFET detainees' cases); Strohmeyer, Collapse,
supra note 82, at 54 (listing the need to establish a review mechanism for detainees'
cases as the most critical reason).
Chesterman, Justice UnderInternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
92.
7; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 265; Strohmeyer, Collapse,
supra note 82, at 54.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
93.
7; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 265; Strohmeyer, Collapse,
supra note 82, at 54; see, e.g., Joel C. Beauvais, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of
U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1149 (arguing
that UNTAET has been "much more aggressive in moving toward East Timorese
management of rule of law institutions").
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as paralegals with Timorese human rights organizations and
resistance groups. '94 None of the appointees had prior judicial or
prosecutorial experience. 95 Thus, the concept of "Timorization" refers
to the identity of particular officials as opposed to "the establishment
of support structures to ensure that individuals could fulfill their
responsibilities." 96 In order to train the new appointees, UNTAET
developed a three-tiered approach, which included a one week "quick
impact" course before appointment, mandatory ongoing training, and
a "mentoring scheme."9 7 Unfortunately, resources were limited, and
UNTAET experienced difficulties in recruiting experienced mentors
with civil law backgrounds, which seriously threatened the success of
98
the training program.
Quite apart from the limited legal training that was possible
during the period of UNTAET administration (which was shorter
than even a three-year law degree), a greater source of potential
instability was the political situation upon independence. 99 It is
arguable that continuing the international administration or a large
foreign military presence would ultimately have encouraged freeriding on the part of the government, and that limited peacekeeping
Nevertheless, the
resources needed to be deployed elsewhere.
international presence can certainly take some responsibility for
laying the foundations for disorder by leaving in place a government
where President Xanana Gusmdo enjoyed massive popular support
(including that of the military) without meaningful constitutional
power, while Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri had constitutional
authority but little personal public support.' 0 0 This contributed to

94.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
7; see also Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82, at 54 (describing the limited practical
experience of the newly hired jurists).
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
95.
7; Strohmeyer, Collapse, supranote 82, at 54.
CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supranote 75, at 171.
96.
97.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra note 75, at
7; Strohmeyer, Building a New Judiciary, supra note 81, at 272-73, Strohmeyer,
Collapse, supra note 82, at 55-56.
98.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
7; Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 82, at 56.
99.
See S.C. Res. 1410, para. 6, U.N. Doc. SJRES/1410 (May 17, 2002) ("[nloting
that the emerging institutions in East Timor remain fragile and that in the period
immediately after independence assistance will be required to ensure sustained
momentum in the development and strengthening of East Timor's infrastructure,
Completed
public administration, law enforcement and defence capacities");
Peacekeeping Operations, East Timor, http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm (last
visited Nov. 3, 2009) (stating that the UNTAET administration started 25 Oct. 1999
and ended 17 May 2002).
100.

Cf. CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 233 ("Through

embracing formal processes that led to Fretilin's domination of the political landscape
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outbursts of violence in December 2002, June 2006, and February
2008.101
Given the subsequent instability in Timor-Leste, what lessons, if
any, were drawn from the period of international administration?
Timor-Leste's emergency powers in the constitution adopted upon
independence in May 2002 are, unusually, gathered under an
Agambenesque subheading:
Section 25 (State of exception)
1. Suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights, freedoms and
guarantees shall only take place if a state of siege or a state of
emergency has been declared as provided for by the Constitution.
2. A state of siege or a state of emergency shall only be declared in case
of effective or impending aggression by a foreign force, of serious
disturbance or threat of serious disturbance to the democratic
constitutional order, or of public disaster.
3. A declaration of a state of siege or a state of emergency shall be
substantiated, specifying rights, freedoms and guarantees the exercise
of which is to be suspended.
4. A suspension shall not last for more than thirty days, without
prejudice of possible justified renewal, when strictly necessary, for
equal periods of time.
5. In no case shall a declaration of a state of siege affect the right to life,
physical integrity, citizenship, non-retroactivity of the criminal law,
defence in a criminal case and freedom of conscience and religion, the
right not to be subjected to torture, slavery or servitude, the right not to
be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
and the guarantee of non-discrimination.
6. Authorities shall restore constitutional normality as soon as
possible. 102

Subsequent provisions set out the means by which such a declaration
is to be made. The power to do so is granted exclusively to the
President, but this is to follow "authorisation of the National
Parliament, after consultation with the Council of State, the
10 3
Government and the Supreme Council of Defence and Security."
When Parliament is not in session, the power of authorization falls to

while endorsing the charismatic legitimacy of Gusmdo, UNTAET sowed the seeds of a
possible confrontation.").
101.
See generally Lirio de Fonseca, Riots Grip East Timor's Capital, GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 5, 2002, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/dec/05/indonesia.easttimor
(noting the prime minister's request for calm after rioting in East Timor left at least five
people dead and the prime minister's house burned); BBC News, Timeline: East Timor,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1504243.stm (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (listing
violent events in East Timor's history from May to June 2006 that eventually led to
Prime Minster Mari Alkatari's resignation and the February 2008 shooting that left
President Jose Ramos-Horta injured in the stomach and rebel leader Alfredo Renaido
dead).
102.
CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE § 25.
103.
Id. § 85(g); see also id. § 95(3)(j) (providing the National Parliament the
power to "authorise and confirm the declaration").
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the Standing Committee. 10 4 The Government, for its part, has the
power to propose such a declaration to the President.1 0 5
The Timorese Constitution draws in part on the Constitution of
Portugal. 10 6 In particular, the threshold for declaring a state of
emergency is very similar, with the Portuguese Constitution (under
the more prosaic heading "Suspension of the Exercise of Rights")
allowing for such a declaration in cases of "actual or imminent
aggression by foreign forces, a serious threat to or disturbance of
constitutional democratic order, or public disaster." 10 7 This is a
significantly broader set of circumstances than that recognized in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which TimorLeste acceded, which limits derogations to "a public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation."10 8 Indeed, Timor-Leste goes beyond
the Portuguese baseline of either "serious threat to or disturbance of
constitutional democratic order" by allowing for a state of emergency
to be declared if there is a "serious disturbance or threat of serious
disturbance to the democratic constitutional order." 10 9
Nevertheless, there would appear to be little question that the
higher threshold had been reached on the two occasions when a state
of emergency was declared. The first followed a dispute between the
military and the Fretilin-dominated leadership, with 600 soldiers
deserting and an escalation of violence through March and April 2006
that saw numerous deaths, including nine unarmed police killed by
soldiers. 110 President Gusmdo declared a state of emergency on May
31, 2006, in part to reassert control over the armed forces, but also in

104.
Id. § 102(3)(g).
105.
Id. § 115(2)(c).
106.
See Laura Grenfell, Legal Pluralismand the Rule of Law in Timor Leste, 19
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 305, 309 (2006) (noting the Portuguese aspects of Timor-Leste's
CONSTITUTION). For a critique of the failure to engage with legal pluralism in TimorLeste, see generally id.
107.
CONSTITUIQAO DA REPUBLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION OF THE
PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC] art. 19, para. 2.
108.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 7; cf.
ARTICLE 19 & INTERNEWS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE MEDIA IN TIMOR-LESTE
40 (2005), available at http:/www.article19.org/pdfslpublications/timor-leste-baselinestudy.pdf (noting that the terms "serious disturbance" and "public disorder" are
"excessively broad and vague").
109.
CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE § 25 (2).
110.
See Nine Unarmed Police Killed in East Timor, USA TODAY, May 26, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-05-25-easttimor_x.htm
(giving account of
the violence in Timor-Leste by dissident soldiers upon the arrival of an Australian-led
peacekeeping force); Jane Perlez, East Timor Resignation Raises Hopes for End to
Violence, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2006, http:/Iwww.nytimes.com/2006/06/27/world/asia/
27timor.html (reporting hopes that resignation of East Timor Prime Minister Mar
Alkatiri would pave the way to the resolution of violence in the country).
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order to force the resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri. Alkatiri
ultimately resigned on June 26, 2006.111
A state of emergency was declared for a second time following
assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister on
February 11, 2008, apparently led by Alfredo Reinado-a rebel soldier
who had deserted in the May 2006 unrest. Reinado had been
detained by Portuguese and Australian troops but escaped a month
later. 112 As President Jose Ramos-Horta had been shot, the Speaker
of the National Parliament took on the function of acting
President. 113 On behalf of the government, now-Prime Minister
Xanana Gusmdo requested an initial state of emergency of forty-eight
hours in order to suspend the right to free movement, impose a dusk
to dawn curfew, and prohibit any assembly or demonstration. 114 This
was subsequently extended by ten days in order to cover Reinado's
116
funeral 1 5 and then by an additional thirty days.
It is far too early to draw any meaningful conclusions about how
emergency powers will be invoked in Timor-Leste in the future. It is
not clear, however, that it is possible to distinguish an Asian or nonWestern position. Relations with Indonesia remain somewhat tense,
and the constitution and the ruling elite look more to Portugal for
guidance. 117 ASEAN has been reluctant to consider Timor-Leste as a

111.
Cf. Tom Hyland, Charges Over Timor Violence, SUNDAY AGE (Melbourne),
Oct. 8, 2006 (describing the violence that errupted in April of 2006 and speculated
political ramifications, also attempting to discredit a conspiracy theory that the
violence was orchestrated by either the President or the Prime Minister for political
reasons); Graham Lloyd, Trio Holds Key to Resolving Conflict, COURIER MAIL (Austl.),
June 3, 2006 (describing the relationships between key political players in East
Timorese politics).
112.
Ben Doherty, A Defiant Rebel to the End, AGE (Melbourne), Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.theage.com.aulnews/in-depthla-defiant-rebel-to-the-end/2008/02/11/120257
8699472.html.
113.

See CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE § 84(1)

("During temporary impediment of the President of the Republic, the presidential
functions shall be taken over by the Speaker of National Parliament or, in case of
impediment of the latter, by his or her replacement.").
114.
Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister, East Timor, Message to the Nation (Feb.
11, 2008),
available at http://www.easttimorlegalinformation.orgLegalNews/
February_2008_4.html.
115.
State of Emergency Extended in East Timor, ABC NEWS, Feb. 14, 2008,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/02/13/2162141.htm.
116.
In Brief, President Improves, AUSTL., Feb. 22, 2008, at 10. The state of
emergency was ultimately lifted in all but one district on April 22, 2008. See Mark
Metherell, E. Timor Told to Follow the Rules, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Austl.), Apr.
23, 2008 ("[T]he state of siege would be extended for another month in a district where
army rebels involved in the assassination attempt are believed to be hiding.").
117.
See International Crisis Group, Managing Tensions on the TimorListe/Indonesia Border: Overview, http://www.crisisgroup.org[home/index.cfm?id=
4629&1=1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2009) (noting that while East Timor and Indonesia have
"managed to establish good bilateral relations," the spectre of human rights violations
and East Timor's independence continues to fraught relations between the two
countries); cf. Alison Roberts, Deutsche Welle, Timor Leste and Portugal: A Special
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potential member. 118 Australia's ongoing military support will be
essential for stability.
The UN presence, which was extended
through February 2010, provides additional oversight. 119 TimorLeste thus has little Asian identification and enjoys far closer formal
and substantive relations with Western states and the UN-even if
those relations resemble the colonial ties of earlier times.
It
demonstrates, if anything, the extent to which even this newest of
states found itself swiftly drawn into a familiar discourse on and
practice of the rule of law.

III.

COMPROMISING THE RULE OF LAW BECAUSE OF EMERGENCY

Where the previous Part looked at UN efforts to promote the rule
of law by invoking exceptional powers, this Part will consider the
application of rule of law principles to the UN itself and examine the
manner in which it was prepared to compromise them in the hope of
achieving a more modest form of organized political life in
Afghanistan.
A. Does the Rule of Law Apply to the United Nations?
The United Nations is not a party to the human rights treaties
120
negotiated under its auspices or monitored through its agencies.
In part, this reflects the traditional view that only states properly
enter into such treaties, a view also supported by the understanding
that it is primarily states that violate or protect human rights. 121 As
the UN has assumed state-like functions, however-including
administrations that managed entire territories-the question of
whether the UN is required to abide by basic human rights standards
has become more pressing. Arguments that the UN should be bound
sometimes proceed on the basis that such a conclusion is self-evident

Relationship, http://www2.dw-world.de/southasialSoutheastAsia/1.234818. 1.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2009) ("[L]inks with Portugal remain important-links which are as
much strategic as sentimental.").
118.
See Press Release, Ass'n of Se. Asian Nations, East Timor Needs Five Years
to Join ASEAN: PM (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.aseansec.org/afp/154.htm
(quoting East Timor Prime Minister's statement that it will take the country five years
to join ASEAN as it meets the organization's strict requirements for membership).
119.
S.C. Res. 1867, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1867 (Feb. 26, 2009).
120.
Julia Werzer, The UN Human Rights Obligations and Immunity: An
Oxymoron Casting a Shadow on the TransitionalAdministrations in Kosovo and East
Timor, 77 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 105, 108 (2008).
121.
Cf. Ruwantissa Abeyratne, The United Nations and Perspectives on Good
Government, DAILY NEWS (Sri Lanka), May 10, 2008, http://www.dailynews.lld
2008/05/10/fea0l.asp (noting that the UN does not act in its own right but instead
operates as a group of states acting individually).
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from the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. 122 A second
approach asserts that the UN has sufficient legal personality to be
bound by customary international law. 1 23 A third approach focuses
on the activities of the UN and the state-like functions that it now
exercises. 124 In a series of cases arising from the use of targeted
financial sanctions, the European Court of First Instance has held
that Security Council decisions, by virtue of the UN Charter's
primacy clause in Article 103, are constrained only by norms of jus
cogens. 125 This is one of only a few cases in which a tribunal has
12 6
reviewed, even indirectly, the validity of Council action.
Apart from the general "state of exception" that might be used to
1 27
characterize the Security Council's use of Chapter VII powers most obviously to authorize the use of military force to restore peace
and security-two sets of activities undertaken with the authority of
the Council warrant closer analysis for their proximity to national
debates about states of emergency: detention without trial in a period
of relative calm and confiscation of assets without judicial review.
1.

Kosovo: Executive Detentions

Kosovo, like Timor-Leste, was an unusual situation in which the
UN exercised de facto day-to-day governance over a territory and
population that was technically part of what remained of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (later renamed Serbia and Montenegro, and
after further secession simply "Serbia") but always destined for a
political future separate from that of Belgrade. 128 As indicated

122.
Werzer, supranote 120, at 109 (citing F. Mbgret & F. Hoffmann, The UN as
a Human Rights Violator?: Some Reflections on the United Nations Changing Human
Rights Responsibilities,25 HUM. RTS. Q. 314, 317-18 (2003)).
Id. at 108-09, 118 (citing M~gret & F. Hoffmann, supra note 122, at 314; A.
123.
Reinisch, Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, 7 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 131, 134-35 (2001)).
124.
See id. (explaining that proponents of the third approach argue that the UN
should be bound by international human rights law to the same extent its member
states are bound; otherwise, states could empower an international organization to act
for them as a means of escaping their international obligations) (citing M6gret & F.
Hoffmann, supra note 122, at 318).
125.
Id. at 111, 113-14.
126.
See Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 para. 118 (June 21) (referring to "a situation which
the Court has found to have been validly declared illegal" by the Security Council);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on The Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 28-30 (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51OO2.htm ("[Nleither the text nor the spirit
of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus (unbound by law).").
127.
Schott, supra note 12.
128.
Carsten Stahn, The United Nations TransitionalAdministrationsin Kosovo
and East Timor: A FirstAnalysis, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 108, 108-09 (2001).
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earlier, however, UNMIK's faith in the judiciary and its own
credibility as a lawmaker were shaky. One consequence of this was
recourse to executive detentions.
On May 28, 2000, Afrim Zeqiri, a Kosovar Albanian and former
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighter, was arrested on suspicion of
murder for the deaths of three Serbs, one of which was a four-year-old
boy. 129 The Albanian prosecutor ordered Zeqiri's release due to lack
of evidence and raised suspicions of judicial bias. 130 An international
judge upheld the decision; however, Special Representative of the
Secretary- General (SRSG) Bernard Kouchner (currently, the Foreign
Minister of France) ordered that Zeqiri remain detained under an
"executive hold" and claimed authority to issue such orders for
"security reasons" and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1244
(1999).131 SRSG Hans Haekkerup, the successor to Kouchner, gave
similar orders in response to an incident that occurred in February
2001, when a bus carrying Serbian passengers from Nis to Kosovo
was bombed, killing eleven. 132 In mid-March, British KFOR troops
arrested four ethnic Albanians for this crime, a panel of international
judges ordered that three of them be released later that month (the
fourth escaped). 133 On March 28, Haekkerup issued an executive
order extending detention for the suspects by thirty days, later
134
issuing six additional orders of extended detention.
Criticism by the OSCE Ombudsperson 35 and international
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International led to UNMIK's establishment of a Detention
Review Commission of international experts in August 2001.136 The
Commission approved the order to extend the detentions of the Nis
bombing arrestees to December 19, 2001 (a few weeks after the first

129.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
5; see also O'NEILL, supra note 77, at 86.
130.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
5; see also O'NEILL, supra note 77, at 86.

131.
supra note
note 75, at
132.
5.
133.
134.

CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 167 (citing O'NEILL,
77, at 86); Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration,supra
5.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
Id.
Id.

135.
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No 3: On the
Conformity of Deprivations of Liberty Under "Executive Orders" with Recognized
International Standards, delivered to the SRSG (June 29, 2001), available at
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/E4010629a.pdf.
136.
Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War: Intelligence
and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1071, 1116 n.202 (2006) [hereinafter
Chesterman, The Spy]; David Marshall & Shelley Inglis, Human Rights in Transition:
The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the United Nations Mission in
Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 113 (2003).
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provincial elections in Kosovo), concluding that "there [were]
reasonable grounds to suspect that each of the detained persons ha[d]
committed a criminal act." 137 The Kosovo Supreme Court finally
ordered release of the three detainees at the end of that period, as the
138
three-month mandate of the Commission had not been renewed.
Afrim Zeqiri, the last detainee held under Executive Order, was
released on bail in early February 2002 (after approximately twenty
3 9
months of detention).
Two years after the establishment of UNMIK, officials argued
that Kosovo still ranked as an "internationally-recognized
emergency."'140
Such circumstances, they argued, require that
"international human rights standards accept the need for special
measures that, in the wider interests of security, and under
prescribed legal conditions, allow authorities to respond to the
findings of intelligence that are not able to be presented to the court
system." 141 Indeed, human rights law provides for derogation from
particular norms, for example, the right to a fair trial, but this type of
derogation is typically limited to circumstances of "war or other
public emergency threatening the life of the nation," and some form of
official notification of the circumstances is required. 14 2 This type of
notification was not given in Kosovo, likely due to political
reservations in regards to admitting that Kosovo, even two years
after UNMIK arrived, remained a "public emergency."'143 Producing
an odd result in a war primarily justified on the grounds of support
for human rights, a Chapter VII resolution adopted by the Security
Council somehow absolved a UN operation from certain human rights
144
obligations.

137.
Simon Chesterman, Rough Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in PostConflict Territories, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 69, 83 (2005) [hereinafter
Chesterman, Rough Justice] (citing Press Release, UNMIK, Supreme Court Releases
Nis Bomb Suspects (Dec. 19, 2001), available at www.unmikonline.org/press/
2001/press-r/pr671.htm); Chesterman, The Spy, supra note 136, at 1116 n.202 (citing
Arben Qirezi, Kosovo: Court Overturns Haekkerup Detention Orders, IWPR BALKAN
CRISIS REPORT NO. 308 (Jan. 11, 2002)); Marshall & Inglis, supra note 136, at 114.
138.
Chesterman, Rough Justice, supra note 137, at 83 (citing Press Release,
UNMIK, supra note 138); Marshall & Inglis, supra note 136, at 114.
139.
Chesterman, Justice Under InternationalAdministration, supra note 75, at
6.
140.
Id. at 5; Marshall & Inglis, supra note 136, at 114.
141.
Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo: State-Building and Substantial
Autonomy, INT'L PEACE ACAD. REP., Aug. 2001, at 11 [hereinafter Chesterman, Kosovo
in Limbo] (quoting UNMIK Refutes Allegations of Judicial Bias and Lack of Strategy,
UNMIK NEWS, June 25, 2001 at 2).
142.
CHESTERMAN, You, THE PEOPLE, supra note 75, at 149 (quoting Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950,
Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supranote 108, art. 4).
143.
Simon Chesterman, Kosovo in Limbo, supra note 141, at 11.
144.
Id. at 11.
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Targeted Financial Sanctions

A second instance of quasi-emergency powers being invoked
through the UN is the use of targeted financial sanctions. Security
Council Resolution 1267 (1999) established a committee (the 1267
Committee) to oversee implementation of a sanctions regime that
initially targeted Afghanistan's Taliban government but was later
expanded to apply to Osama bin Laden and "individuals and entities
associated with him as designated by the Committee, including those
in the Al-Qaida organization."' 14 5 Following the September 11, 2001
attacks on the United States and the successful military operation in
Afghanistan, the regime was further expanded in January 2002 with
the removal of a geographic connection to Afghanistan and any time
14 6
limit on the government's application.
The targeted sanctions in question entailed the worldwide
freezing of an individual's assets. 147 The process for identifying those
individuals whose assets should be frozen, however, was somewhat
opaque. Only upon the passage of Resolution 1526 in January 2004
were Member States proposing individuals called upon to provide
148
information demonstrating an association with Al Qaida.
Resolution 1526 "encourage[d]' Member States to notify such
149
individuals and inform them that their assets were being frozen.
In July 2005, approximately six years after the listing regime was
established, Resolution 1617 required Member States to provide the
Committee a "statement of case describing the basis of the proposal"
whenever they proposed additional names for the consolidated list. 150
However, this did not affect the individuals and entities (over 400)
15 1
that had already been listed without a formal statement of case.
Additionally, Resolution 1617 "request[ed] relevant States to inform,
to the extent possible, and in writing where possible, individuals and
entities included in the Consolidated List of the measures imposed on
them, the Committee's guidelines, and, in particular, the listing and
delisting procedures."'1 52 Meanwhile, the sanctions regime had been

145.
Chesterman, The Spy, supra note 136, at 1111-12 (citing S.C. Res. 1333,
para. 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000)).
146.
Id. at 1112 (citing S.C. Res. 1390, para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28,
2002)).
147.
Id. at 1111 (citing S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 146, para. 2(a)).
148.
Id. at 1112 (citing S.C. Res. 1526, para. 17, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30,
2004)).
149.
Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 149, para. 18).
150.
Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1617, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July. 29, 2005)).
151.
Id.
152.
Id. (quoting S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 150, para. 5).
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challenged in European courts on the basis that assets were being
15 3
frozen without adequate legal protections.
The European Court of First Instance held that the ability to
review decisions ultimately made by the Security Council was
severely limited. 154 Nevertheless,
the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the
resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus
cogens, understood as a body of higher rules of public international law
binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the
155
United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible.

The Court found that this very high threshold had not been reached
in the cases before it. 1 56 In January 2008, the Advocate General of
the European Court of Justice argued that measures adopted by the
Council applied within the European Community only to the extent
that this was compatible with Community law: "There is no reason,
therefore, for the Court to depart, in the present case, from its usual
interpretation of the fundamental rights that have been invoked by
the appellant."' 57 As for what this might mean for states bound by
Article 103 of the UN Charter, 158 the Advocate General merely noted
its understanding that such a ruling might "inconvenience the
Community and its Member States in their dealings on the
international stage.' 5 9
In September 2008, the European Court of Justice held that,
while it did not purport to challenge the primacy of the Security
Council's resolutions as a matter of international law-contradicting
the Court of First Instance on this point-it could nevertheless review
the lawfulness of the Community act intended to give effect to those
resolutions. 160
The European regulation in question violated
fundamental rights (effective judicial protection and respect for

153.
Mehrdad Payandeh & Heiko Sauer, European Union: UN Sanctions and
EU FundamentalRights, 7 INT'L CONST. L.J. 306, 309 (2009).
154.
Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. T306/01, para. 339.
155.
Id. para. 277; Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council of the European Union, 2006
E.C.R. T-49/04; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. T253/02; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 2005 E.C.R. T-315/01.
156.
Case T-306/01, supra note 154, para. 289.
157.
Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union,
and Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European Union, 2008 E.C.R. 299, para.
46 (separate opinion of Advocate General Maduro regarding Case C-415/05).
158.
See U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the
present Charter shall prevail.").
159.
Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05 P, supra note 157, para. 39 (separate
opinion of Advocate General Maduro regarding Case C-415/05).
160.
Id. paras. 286-88 (majority opinion).
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property) and was therefore struck down. 16 1
Nevertheless, as
annulment with immediate effect "would be capable of seriously and
irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness" of the measures imposed by
the Council, the effects of the regulation would be maintained for
162
three months.
B. Compromising the Rule of Law in Afghanistan
The rule of law was compromised in a quite different manner in
Afghanistan, which faced challenges distinct from Timor-Leste and
represented an entirely different context. The UN advocated a "light
footprint" approach as a means of promoting local ownership, though
it was only practical given the size and population of the country and
politically viable given the undisputed sovereignty of the Afghan
government under Hamid Karzai. 163 This substantially limited the
role that the international presence played, though key areas were
'64
still potentially "externalized.'
Under the Taliban's rule, justice in Afghanistan had been
"notoriously capricious and brutal," and in its own way, the overthrow
was similarly brutal. 165 In addition to reports of anti-Taliban forces
summarily executing prisoners of war amidst the fighting, there were
also allegations of Rashid Dostum's troops killing Taliban detainees
by the hundreds while the detainees were transported in sealed
freight containers. 16 6 Unfortunately, these and other allegations
against members of Hamid Karzai's new government went
67
uninvestigated.1
The Bonn Agreement provided that the Interim and later
Transitional Authority should, "with the assistance of the United
Nations, establish an independent Human Rights Commission, whose
responsibilities will include human rights monitoring, investigation of
violations of human rights, and development of domestic human rights
institutions." At the same time, the UN was separately granted "the
right to investigate human rights violations and, where necessary,
recommend corrective action," as well as to develop and implement a
human rights education program. In keeping with the "light footprint"
philosophy, senior UN staff was circumspect about taking the lead in
human rights.
Under the Bonn Agreement, the Interim Authority was to establish,
"with the assistance of the United Nations, a Judicial Commission to

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. paras. 322-28.
Id. para. 373.
Chesterman, Rough Justice, supra note 137, at 89.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. (citing World Report, 2003 HUM. RTS. WATCH 198).
Id. (citing World Report, 2003 HUM. RTS. WATCH 198).

1536

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:1509

rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic
principles, international standards, the rule of law[,] and Afghan legal
'168
traditions."

A document from the Office of the Special Representative
emphasized the need for a careful, strategic approach:
[A]Ill agree that global experience in justice reform and development has
shown that non-strategic, piecemeal and "interventionist" approaches
can have dire consequences for the effective development of [the justice]
sector. A strategic, comprehensive, Afghan led, integrated programme
of justice sector reform and development can only begin with a
comprehensive sectoral review and assessment of domestic needs,
priorities, initiatives and capacities for reconstruction and development
169
of this crucial sector. To date, none has been undertaken.

These assumptions are, to a large extent, debatable, given the
experiences of Timor-Leste and Kosovo:
UNMIK in particular found that failure to engage immediately with
rule of law questions can eliminate the opportunity for the maximum
It is true that a strategic,
impact of international engagement.
comprehensive approach is desirable, but not if it means indefinite
delays until the security environment allows for a thorough review. If
necessary, skeletal legal reforms might be made on an emergency basis
until a more strategic approach can be formulated.
In Afghanistan, UNAMA's [the U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan's] mandate was interpreted as requiring the U.N. to
facilitate rather than lead. In areas such as the choice of laws, the
structure of the legal system, and appointment of judges, this was
entirely appropriate. But such an interpretation was less persuasive in
relation to basic questions of rebuilding courthouses, procuring legal
texts and office equipment, and training of judges. Instead, it appeared
that rule of law was simply not a priority. In the 48-page National
Framework
drafted by the Afghan Assistance
Development
Coordination Authority (AACA) in April 2002, the justice system
17 0
warranted only a single substantive sentence.

Italy agreed to serve as "lead donor" on the justice sector at the Tokyo
pledging conference in January 2002, essentially because the other
"lead donor" portfolios had already been taken, and there was little
evidence of activity in this area. 17 1 Courts that were able to function
did so erratically, despite the Afghan Interim Authority's
appointments of new judges (which even included a number of

168.
Id. at 91-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Agreement on Provisional
Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent
Government Institutions, annex II, para. 6, in Letter from Kofi A. Annon, Sec'y-Gen., to
the President of the United Nations Sec. Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter Bonn Agreement]).
Id. at 94 & n.99 (citing OFFICE OF THE SRSG FOR AFGHANISTAN, PROPOSAL
169.
FOR A MULTI-AGENCY REVIEW OF JUSTICE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 2
(2002)).
Chesterman, Rough Justice, supranote 137, at 94-95 (citations omitted).
170.
171.
Id. at 95.
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chief
women), 172 and Karzai's appointment of a septuagenarian
173
justice with no secular legal background did not help matters.
Of still greater concern than the relative inattention to
establishing the rule of law-admittedly difficult in a country that
had known little peace in a generation-was the preparedness of both
international and national actors to look the other way as war
criminals moved into political office and narco-trafficking was used to
1 74
supplement ministerial appropriations.
The formal laws on declarations of a state of emergency in the
constitution ultimately adopted in 2004 are not especially
controversial; if anything, the relevant chapter is restrictive, setting
up a potentially tense relationship between the President and the
National Assembly, which must "consent" to a state of emergency
longer than two months and "endorse" any state of emergency of a
short period:
Chapter Nine: State of Emergency
Article 143. If because of war, threat of war, serious rebellion, natural
disasters or similar conditions, protection of independence and national
life become impossible through the channels specified in this
Constitution, the state of emergency shall be proclaimed by the
President, throughout the country or part thereof, with endorsement of
the National Assembly. If the state of emergency continues for more
than two months, the consent of the National Assembly shall be
required for its extension.
Article 144. During the state of emergency, the President can, in
consultation with the presidents of the National Assembly as well as
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, transfer some powers of the
National Assembly to the government.
Article 145. During the state of emergency, the President can, after
approval by the presidents of the National Assembly as well as the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suspend the enforcement of the
following provisions or place restrictions on them:
1. Clause Two of Article Twenty-Seven [no detention without due
process];
2. Article Thirty-Six [right to free assembly];
3. Clause Two
correspondence];

of Article

Thirty-Seven

[privacy

of

personal

4. Clause Two of Article Thirty-Eight [restrictions on power to search
personal residences].
Article 146. The Constitution shall not be amended during the state of
emergency.

172.
173.

Id.
Id. (citing Hafizullah Gardish, Chief Justice Under Scrutiny, INST. WAR &

PEACE REPORTING AFGHAN RECOVERY REP., Mar. 28, 2003).

See Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction Five Years Later: Narratives
174.
of Progress, Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of Law in a TransitionalIslamic
Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 269, 274-75, 284 (2007) (noting suspicions of war
criminals serving public office and narco-funding).
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Article 147. If the presidential term or the legislative term of the
National Assembly expires during the state of emergency, the new
general elections shall be postponed, and the presidential as well as
parliamentary terms shall extend up to four months. If the state of
emergency continues for more than four months, the President shall
call the Loya Jirga. Within two months after the termination of the
state of emergency, elections shall be held.
Article 148. At the termination of the state of emergency, measures
adopted under Article One Hundred Forty-Four and One Hundred
17 5
Forty-Five of this Constitution shall be void immediately.

These provisions broadly correspond to the relevant provisions of the
1964 constitution, with the role of the king being taken by the
President and slightly greater power being granted to the National
176
Assembly than was enjoyed by the Loya Jirga (Great Council).
The threshold established by the Constitution is significantly
higher than that in Timor-Leste and more closely follows the model of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, though not
its limitation of any derogation "to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation."1 77 Significantly greater checks do exist
on the potential exercise of powers, including enumeration of those
rights from which derogation is possible (rather than saving of
specific rights) and oversight of such derogation by both the
178
legislature and the chief justice.
As with Timor-Leste, however, it is difficult to draw
generalizations from the case of Afghanistan applicable to a larger
non-Western or Asian context. Afghanistan's regional identification
is weak, though unlike Timor-Leste it successfully resisted
colonization and thus lacked an externally-derived legal system that
could be reintroduced. 179 In any case, the resurgence of the Taliban
and the limited ability of the central government to exercise power in
much of the country continues to pose grave threats to the life of the
nation.' 8 0 It is not clear that a declaration of a state of emergencyas opposed to enhanced international military support-would alter
this.

175
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN art. 143-48; see also id. art. 64(8)
(providing that the President has the power to proclaim and terminate a state of
emergency "with the endorsement of the National Assembly").
176.
CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN
OF 1964, tit. 9, available at
http://www.afghan-web.comlhistory/const/const1964.html.
177.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 108, art.
4(1).
178.
Id. art. 4(2).
179.
Chesterman, Rough Justice, supra note 137, at 89.
180.
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In fact, despite its troubled recent history, Afghanistan has
never invoked its state of emergency provisions. Some Afghan
scholars and watchers wryly speculate that the government might
instead one day declare a state of "normality." 18 1

IV.

CONCLUSION: THE "WAYS OF ORIENTALS"?

This brief survey of the ways in which the UN has supported and
compromised the rule of law in Asian contexts may, in the end, offer
more heat than light.
On the relationship between formal and informal institutions,
recurrent tensions in UN peace operations exist between form and
substance, as well as between short-term stability and longer-term
sustainability. In Timor-Leste, the government inherited a country
that was both the newest and the poorest in the region, with a
constitutional structure that set in place an inevitable clash of
personalities. Remarkably, the consequences of that clash were
managed within the four corners of the constitution, though this
depended heavily on the ongoing support of the UN and military
contributions from Australia and other states. In Afghanistan, some
UN officials saw the rule of law as a luxury for a state that could hope
for, at best, a kind of organized anarchy even in good times.' 8 2 This
essentially acknowledged by default the ongoing importance of
informal institutions at the local level, even as such local
commanders (i.e., warlords) were formally denounced as undermining
the hopes of stability. In both cases, area specialists have been
critical of foreign receptiveness to existing local institutions, though it
is not clear that either offers broad lessons for a coherent nonWestern narrative.
With respect to the relationship between emergency powers and
the rule of law, one interesting dimension of the examples considered
above is the manner in which the invocation of extraordinary powers
at the international level is grounded on a claim to establish or
support the rule of law. As indicated earlier, these powers are
properly understood as "exceptions," both in the formal sense that the
Security Council only enjoys any power to intrude upon the domestic
jurisdiction in a time of crisis and in the practical sense that the

Cf., e.g., Venkat Iyer, States of Emergency-Moderating Their Effects on
181.
Human Rights, 22 DALHOUSIE L.J. 125, 127 n.1 (1999) (noting that in some countries,
the "normality" is antithetical to human rights).
182.
Contra Press Release, Security Council, Iraq, Middle East, Afghanistan,
Africa Key Issues Before Security Council in 2003, U.N. Doc. SC/7982 (Jan. 16, 2004)
(noting Secretary-General Kofi Annan's argument that while some had lost faith in a
peace process, the rule of law is not a luxury).
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powers are invoked infrequently. As that frequency has increased
and they have been applied to general rather than particular
problems (to "terrorism" rather than to Libyan support for terrorism,
for example), so has the controversy about the limits to be applied to
them. At the national level, where these extraordinary powers have
been used to impose order it would be too much to imply a kind of
original sin to the institutions thus created.
Nevertheless, the
contradictions between what international administrators say and
what they do have complicated the administration of territory while
under international control and left an uncertain legacy for those who
inherit it.
On the larger question of Asian versus Western discourses on
emergency powers, it is hard to draw general conclusions. TimorLeste does not identify strongly as Asian in a constitutional sense: its
colonial and post-conflict baggage, ongoing ties to Portugal and
Australia, and continuing UN presence bind it to a global (and
perhaps Western) discourse. Certainly the two occasions in which
states of emergency were declared more closely approximate the
Western constitutionalist approach to dealing with crises than, for
example, similar experiences in recent Indonesian history.
Afghanistan for its part suffers from such weakness of central
institutions that it is barely a meaningful state (in the sense of an
organized polity with institutions that can offer some basic public
goods and claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence). As
with Timor-Leste, much of the discourse on emergencies is offered in
language intelligible to the Western ear, though this may bear little
reality to the conflict as it plays out on the ground.
This disconnect between rhetoric and reality is perhaps the most
interesting and troubling aspect of the cases considered here. Upon
his return from an 1889 trip to Persia, Lord Curzon thoughtfully
noted the different perspectives on governance held by Europeans
and "Orientals," who might legitimately regard their own systems of
government as more appropriate than those of Europeans, and in any
case would generally prefer to poorly govern themselves than be
governed well by foreigners. 18 3 Such observations were insightful but
uncharacteristic. As Viceroy of India a decade later, Curzon did not
appoint a single Indian to his advisory council; when asked why, he
absurdly replied that in the entire country there was not an Indian fit
for the post. 1 84 If there is an Asian approach to the development of
constitutional structures emerging from conflict, it is that those
structures inevitably reflect the varied colonial heritage of the region
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and are cast with an eye to international legitimacy but stand or fall
on the basis of local politics.

